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The Eighth Circuit upheld preliminary injunctive relief in
favor of the plaintiffs who challenged Arkansas's anti-loitering
law for violating their free speech rights. Though Arkansas
claimed that it would not enforce the anti-loitering statute
against "'polite' and 'courteous' beggars like [plaintiffs],"
because the law's plain language applied to the plaintiffs'
intended activities, they had an objectively reasonable fear of
prosecution.' Thus, they had a constitutional injury as required
for standing.
The Court affirmed that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed
on their claim that Arkansas's anti-loitering law violates the
First Amendment. Asking for money is protected First
Amendment speech, and protected content-based speech can
only be regulated if the regulation is "narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling state interest.",2 Arkansas argued its compelling
interest is "public and motor vehicle safety through the
prevention of aggressive conduct and traffic hazards." 3
However, the Court concluded that even if the state's interest is
compelling, the law is not narrowly tailored because it is
underinclusive. The law targets only charitable solicitation even
though political and commercial solicitation could present equal
issues for public and motor vehicle safety. The Court then
affirmed that the other preliminary injunction factors were met
and, thus, injunctive relief was proper.
* J.D. Candidate, University of Arkansas School of Law, 2020.
1. Rodgers v. Bryant, 942 F.3d 451, 455 (8th Cir. 2019).
2. Id. at 456 ("Arkansas's anti-loitering law is a content-based restriction because
it... applies only to those asking for charity or gifts, not those who are, for example,
soliciting votes, seeking signatures for a petition, or selling something.").
3. Id. at 457.
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Lastly, it concluded the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it applied the injunction statewide instead of
limiting it to the plaintiffs. The extension was proper because




A former Henderson State University employee filed a §
1983 Complaint against the University's President after being
fired. The district court granted a motion for summary judgment
in the University President's favor, concluding he was entitled to
qualified immunity because the former employee did not show a
violation of a constitutional right.
To establish that her constitutional right was violated, the
former employee needed to show "she was deprived of 'a
property right in continued employment without due process."'
5
The court concluded, based on Arkansas law, she was an at-will
employee even though (1) the Board of Trustees passed a
proposed budget which included her name, title, and salary; and
(2) the employee had an employment contract that expired less
than one month prior to her being placed on administrative
leave.
Additionally, the Court held she did not have a protected
liberty interest in her reputation, which would have entitled her
to a name-clearing hearing. At-will employees are entitled to
such hearings only when their public employers make
significant stigmatizing allegations, which generally involve
claims of "direct dishonesty, immorality, criminality or
racism. ' 6 In this case, the University President did not directly
allege that the employee stole or mismanaged. In contrast, he
(1) wrote an email to university faculty and staff, which
"contained no direct references" to the plaintiff; (2) attached an
audit report to that email mentioning the plaintiff, which he did
4. Id. at 458 (stating "one of the 'principles of equity jurisprudence' is that 'the scope
of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the violation established, not by the
geographical extent of the plaintiff class"' (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682,
702 (1979))).
5. Correia v. Jones, 943 F.3d 845, 847 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Floyd-Gimon v. Univ.
of Ark. for Med. Sci., 716 F.3d 1141, 1146 (8th Cir. 2013)).
6. Id. at 848.
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not author; and (3) commented in newspaper articles, in which
he did not identify or discuss the plaintiff.7 Because the former
employee could not show a constitutional violation, the Eighth
Circuit affirmed that the University President was entitled to
qualified immunity.
RID GELL V. CITY OF PINE BLUFF
A Pine Bluff City Collector sued the city and its mayor
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 for race discrimination after
the recently elected Caucasian mayor fired him. Although the
City Council reinstated him, the mayor subsequently fired the
collector again. Although the jury returned a verdict in favor of
the mayor, it found against the City and awarded $24,080 on the
employee's race discrimination claim. On appeal, the City
argued that the jury's verdict in favor of the mayor barred its
verdict against the City because a municipality can only act
through its employees.
Even though a municipality's liability can depend on the
actions of more than one official,8 the plaintiff rested his case
almost entirely on the mayor's alleged discrimination. Thus, the
Court concluded that because the mayor could not be held liable
for discrimination, neither could the City.9
TOFURKY ISLAND FOODS SPC V. SOMAN 10
Turtle Island Foods SPC d/b/a The Tofurky Company
(Tofurky), the popular plant-based meat producer, challenged
Arkansas law banning the representation of a product as beef,
poultry, livestock, etc. when not derived from the requisite
animal.'1  The law effectively prevents Tofurky from using
words such as "meat," "beef," and "sausage" despite its clear
7. Id. at 849.
8. See Speer v. City of Wynne, 276 F.3d 980, 986 (8th Cir. 2002).
9. Ridgell v. City of Pine Bluff, 935 F.3d 633, 637 (8th Cir. 2019) ("Because there
was no race discrimination in violation of § 1981, the City cannot be held liable for
damages under § 1983."). Additionally, the collector ultimately did not challenge the
jury's verdict in favor of the mayor.
10. Order, Turtle Island Foods SPC v. Soman, No. 4:19-cv-00514-KGB (E.D. Ark.
Dec. 11, 2019).
11. See Ark. Code Ann. § 2-1-305.
2020 881
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product identification as vegetarian, vegan, or plant-based. The
stated legislative purpose "is to protect consumers from being
misled or confused by false or misleading labeling of
agricultural products that are edible by humans.
'" 12
Tofurky requested preliminary injunctive relief on the basis
that the law violates its Free Speech and Due Process rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, respectively. The
federal district court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted
Tofurky injunctive relief, analyzing the issue as an as-applied
constitutional challenge.
Preliminary injunctive relief requires the court to weigh
four factors: (1) whether the movant will likely succeed on the
merits (generally the determining factor in First Amendment
cases); (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (3) the
state of the balance between this harm and the injury that
granting the injunction will inflict on other interested parties if
relief is granted; and (4) the public interest. 13  The Court
concluded Tofurky is likely to succeed on the merits because its
food labels indicating the products are not meat-based likely
dispel consumer confusion regarding the product and are not
inherently misleading. Thus, the commercial speech is subject
to intermediate scrutiny. Because the Court concluded Tofurky
is likely to prevail on its argument that its labeling is neither
false nor misleading, even if the State's interest in "protect[ing]
consumers from being misled or confused by false or misleading
labeling of agricultural products that are edible by humans" 14 is
substantial, the law does not directly and materially advance this
interest. Tofurky will also likely successfully show that the
law's restriction is more extensive than necessary to achieve its
stated purpose.
Second, Tofurky demonstrated a likelihood that it would
suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief by showing that
it could face enormous civil liability if subjected to the law's
penalties. Third, Tofurky is faced with "substantial detrimental
impact" if injunctive relief is not granted and it is forced to
comply with Arkansas law. Likely, Tofurky would either (1)
12. Id. § 2-1-301.
13. Dataphase Sys. Inc. v. CL Sys., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981).




face extreme civil penalties; (2) have to create specialized
marketing and packaging practices for Arkansas specifically at
great financial cost; (3) have to change its marketing and
packing practices nationwide; or (4) wholly refrain from
marketing and selling its products in the state. Thus, the balance
of equities tilts in Tofurky's favor.
Lastly, public interest favors an injunction because the case
involves the protection against violations of constitutional rights.
For all these reasons, the Court granted Tofurky's motion for a
preliminary injunction, enjoining the defendants "from
enforcing the six provisions of Act 501 challenged by Tofurky
and as applied to Tofurky: Arkansas Code Annotated §§ 2-1-
305(2), (5), (6), (8), (9), and (10).'15
15. Id. at 33.
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